Richard Janko's acclaimed translation of Aristotle's _Poetics_ is accompanied by the most comprehensive commentary available in English that does not presume knowledge of the original Greek. Two other unique features are Janko's translations with notes of both the _Tractatus Coislinianus_, which is argued to be a summary of the lost second book of the Poetics, and fragments of Aristotle’s dialogue On Poets, including recently discovered texts about catharsis, which appear in English for the first time.

A promise to do some action seems to create a binding obligation to do that action. And yet, paradoxically, an obligation seems not to be a fact that we can create or bring into existence; we can create an obligation only by creating or bringing into existence something else. The only way to avoid the paradox is to show that the act of promising creates something other than an obligation, which nonetheless binds us to perform the action in question. After (...) considering and rejecting various options such as the promisee's expectation and the promisor's resolve, Prichard locates the bindingness of a promise in a prior general promise, which allows the noises we make when promising to generate an obligation to perform the promised action. (shrink)

To the question ‘What does it mean to act or to do something?’, replies that it is not easy to identify a common character in actions. Begins by examining the position of Cook Wilson, who maintains that ‘to do something’ means to originate, cause, or bring into existence, either directly or indirectly, some not yet existing state either in oneself or some other body. Although Prichard agrees that usually action involves causing something, he observes that causing a change is not (...) itself an activity. In moving one's hand, one performs that indefinable mental activity of willing some change. The movement of the hand is the effect of the action, not the action itself, a fact overlooked by thinkers like Locke. Turning to the nature of the desire behind one's willing, Prichard rejects the view that this desire is actually a desire for the change willed. Despite forceful objections, Prichard maintains that this desire is the desire for the willing of that change. (shrink)

Prichard's concern here is whether a person's obligation depends either on features of his or her situation or on features of his or her thoughts about that situation. Related to this contrast between the objective view and the subjective view is the issue of whether an obligation is an obligation to do some action. To the latter issue, Prichard responds that an obligation is not an obligation to do something, but an obligation to set ourselves to do something; as a (...) consequence, it is necessary to modify the terms of Prichard's primary concern. This modification diminishes the force of the objective view and does nothing to eliminate the central difficulty in the subjective view, namely, that the obligation to do some action is said to depend not on the character that the action would have, but on our belief that it would have that character. The belief that some general character picks out obligations derives from the mistaken habit of regarding the terms ‘right’ and ‘wrong’ as equivalent to ‘ought’ and ‘ought not’. Having highlighted this mistake, Prichard holds that in instances where we have considered the circumstances fully, our thoughts about the situation decide whether we ought to perform a given activity. (shrink)

The act of exchanging one thing for another seems to involve a promise. The confidence needed to relinquish something one has on the understanding that one will receive what another has in exchange can be expressed in terms of resolve. In binding oneself, one thinks that if the other binds himself or herself to perform a given action, then he or she will do that action. In cases in which one person's action does not precede the other's, one's promise involves (...) thinking that if the other binds himself or herself, then he or she will carry out the promised action. (shrink)

A statement in contemporary terms of an Aristotelian approach to ethics, spiced with numerous illustrations from the modern arts and sciences. Veatch attempts to persuade the reader of the importance of the moral and intellectual virtues for leading an ethical life, and ends with a definition of the good "simply as the perfect with respect to the imperfect, the complete with respect to the incomplete, the actual with respect to the potential". He argues against ethical relativism and scepticism, Platonic "intellectualism", (...) Utilitarianism, the contemporary second-intentional linguistic approach, and certain aspects of existentialism.--A. S. H. (shrink)

The Greenberger-Horne-Zeilinger state is the most famous example of a state with multiparticle entanglement. In this article we describe a group theoretic framework we have been developing for understanding the entanglement in general states of two or more quantum particles. As far as entanglement is concerned, two states of n spin-1/2 particles are equivalent if they are on the same orbit of the group of local rotations (U(2)n). We consider both pure and mixed states and calculate the number of independent (...) parameters needed to describe such states up to this equivalence. We describe how the entanglement of states in a given equivalence class may be characterized by the stability group of the action of the group of local rotations on any of the states in the class. We also show how to calculate invariants under the group of local actions for both pure and mixed states. In the case of mixed states we are able to explicitly exhibit sets of invariants which allow one to determine whether two generic mixed states are equivalent up to local unitary transformations. (shrink)

The author re-Examines the evidence (including the manuscript evidence) relevant to an understanding of the historico-Philosophical relationship of john locke to rene descartes and, Consequently, Of the relationship of "the empirical school" to "rationalism." arguing against a standardly accepted view (that of, Among others, Richard aaron), He suggests that, Both early and late, In the drafts of 1671 and in the "mature" "essay", Locke rejected descartes' science and philosophy of science precisely because he rejected his epistemology; furthermore, He rejected descartes' (...) epistemology precisely because he rejected his method and logic. (shrink)

In this paper, we propose a new concept named the uniform single valued neutrosophic graph. An illustrative example and some properties are examined. Next, we develop an algorithmic approach for computing the complement of the single valued neutrosophic graph. A numerical example is demonstrated for computing the complement of single valued neutrosophic graphs and uniform single valued neutrosophic graph.

Discusses central aspects of Kant's work on the nature of morality and the basis of moral obligation. In examining the categorical imperative and the hypothetical imperative, emphasizes the real nature of the distinction between these principles: whereas the former is binding upon every one, the latter is binding only upon some individuals, namely those individuals who want the end for which a prescribed action is a means. Also considers the nature of the will, Kant's criterion of the rightness of a (...) right action, and two criticisms of Kant's view of morality that arise from his attempt to offer a general answer to the question ‘Why ought an action be performed?’ Then turns to Kant's proof of freedom, which it is claimed just barely misses making the right point that action is only possible under the idea of freedom. Concludes by examining Kant's proof of immortality and the existence of God. (shrink)

We present the idea of searching for X-rays as a signature of the mechanism inducing the spontaneous collapse of the wave function. Such a signal is predicted by the continuous spontaneous localization theories, which are solving the “measurement problem” by modifying the Schrödinger equation. We will show some encouraging preliminary results and discuss future plans and strategy.

What role does the wild duck play in Ibsen's famous drama? I argue that, besides mirroring the fate of the human cast members, the duck is acting as animal subject in a quasi-experiment, conducted in a private setting. Analysed from this perspective, the play allows us to discern the epistemological and ethical dimensions of the new scientific animal practice (systematic observation of animal behaviour under artificial conditions) emerging precesely at that time. Ibsen's play stages the clash between a scientific and (...) a romantic understanding of animals that still constitutes the backdrop of most contemporary debates over animals in research. Whereas the scientific understanding reduces the animal's behaviour, as well as its environment, to discrete and modifiable elements, the romantic view regards animals as being at one with (or violently disconnected from) their natural surroundings. (shrink)

Copyright © 2015 by the Society of Criti. Objective: Global lung stress varies considerably with low tidal volume ventilation for acute respiratory distress syndrome. High stress despite low tidal volumes may worsen lung injury and increase risk of death. No widely available parameter exists to assess global lung stress. We aimed to determine whether the volume delivered during a recruitment maneuver is inversely associated with lung stress and mortality in acute respiratory distress syndrome. Design: Substudy of an acute respiratory distress (...) syndrome clinical trial on esophageal pressure-guided positive end-expiratory pressure titration. Setting: U.S. academic medical center. Patients: Forty-two patients with acute respiratory distress syndrome in whom airflow, airway pressure, and esophageal pressure were recorded during the recruitment maneuver. Interventions: A single recruitment maneuver was performed before initiating protocol-directed ventilator management. Recruitment maneuvers consisted of a 30-second breath hold at 40 cm H2O airway pressure under heavy sedation or paralysis. VRM was calculated by integrating the flow-time waveform during the maneuver. End-inspiratory stress was defined as the transpulmonary pressure during end-inspiratory pause of a tidal breath and tidal stress as the transpulmonary pressure difference between end-inspiratory and end-expiratory pauses. Measurements and Main Results: VRM ranged between 7.4 and 34.7 mL/kg predicted body weight. Lower VRM predicted high end-inspiratory and tidal lung stress. After adjusting for Pao2/Fio2 and either driving pressure, tidal volume, or plateau pressure and positive end-expiratory pressure, VRM remained independently associated with both end-inspiratory and tidal stress. In unadjusted analysis, low VRM predicted increased risk of death. VRM remained significantly associated with mortality after adjusting for study arm. Conclusions: Low VRM independently predicts high lung stress and may predict risk of death in patients with acute respiratory distress syndrome. (shrink)

Objective: To review the principles and practice of the use of conscious sedation for IVF.Design: The pertinent literature was reviewed and recommendations are provided.Result(s): Conscious sedation appears to be the most commonly used method of pain relief for transvaginal retrieval of oocytes. Conscious sedation does not require the presence of an anesthesiologist and can be done in freestanding clinics. Agents commonly used include opioids in combination with benzodiazepines. This combination minimizes pain, decreases anxiety, and provides sedation and some amnesia Adjuvants (...) such as promethazine and hydroxyzine can also be used but often are not needed. Conscious sedation is well tolerated by patients and does not require highly specialized equipment. However, there are specific safeguards that should be followed. Only a few toxicity studies have been performed, but they are reassuring because they have not found significant effects on fertilization or cleavage.Conclusion(s): Conscious sedation appears to be a safe and cost-effective method of providing analgesia and anesthesia for transvaginal retrieval of oocytes. (shrink)

Prichard's topic here is the nature of ‘ought’. If we were to take ‘I ought to will x’ to be equivalent to ‘my willing x ought to exist’, then it is true that ‘If I were to will a certain change x, my willing x would be something that ought to exist.’ For this to hold, either my willing x would itself be something good or my willing x would cause something good. Prichard, however, rejects this view on the grounds (...) that one cannot know, in willing x to exist, whether one's willing x is something that ought to exist. One can only know that if one were to will x, one would be willing something that one thought ought to exist. (shrink)

Analyses Green's rather obscure treatment of two important questions: ‘Why does a subject have the duty to obey the ruler or sovereign?’; and ‘Why is the receipt of an order backed by a threat sufficient to establish this duty when the order comes from a ruler?’ Prichard considers Green's position regarding the grounds and justification for obedience to law to be part of a larger theory of moral obligation that is inconsistent with our ordinary moral ideas. To Green's seeming denial (...) of the existence of any natural rights or duties, Prichard responds that Green in fact has failed to state a sense in which there really are natural rights and obligations. Moreover, Green's denial that we can answer the question ‘Why ought we to obey the government?’ can be formulated only by maintaining the existence of an obligation independent of our government's commands. The core of truth in Green's position, according to Prichard, lies in his recognition that a factor necessary to secure obedience is the subject's unselfish interest in the welfare of other members of her community. (shrink)

Endeavours to specify what Aristotle means by αγαθον. In some contexts, this term seems to mean simply ‘that being desired’ or a person's ultimate or non‐ultimate end or aim. In other contexts, αγαθον takes on a normative quality. For his statements to have content, argues Prichard, Aristotle must hold that when we pursue something of a certain kind, such as an honour, we pursue it as a good. Prichard argues that by αγαθον Aristotle actually means ‘conducive to happiness’, and holds (...) that when a man acts deliberately, he does it from a desire to be happy. Prichard attributes this position to Plato as well, despite the fact that both thinkers make statements inconsistent with this view of our ultimate aim. (shrink)